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This paper focuses on the treatment of prudence by Adam Smith. Smith was one of the few 
philosophers to conceive of it as a moral virtue. Smithian prudence is the care of one’s own 
happiness that is limited and ennobled, respectively, by the sense of justice and self-
command. A reconstruction of Smith’s view of prudence helps to clarify three central points 
in his thought: the interaction between the agent’s economic and moral dimensions, the 
relationship between the self and the other, and the dialectical tension between partiality and 
impartiality. Furthermore, Smithian prudence is important, in itself, as an approach to the 
above-mentioned points that is still viable. These three points are recurrent crucial issues in 
the history of ethics. 
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Introduction  
In moral philosophy the case of prudence as a virtue is a peculiar one. In classical 
ethics, it was one of the cardinal virtues, along with justice, temperance, and fortitude. 
However, only prudence was to lose its characterisation as a virtue in the modern era, 
around the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Den Uyl 1991: 1-2, 15). Adam Smith 
was one of the last philosophers to consider prudence as a moral virtue.1 After Smith, 
prudence declined into Klugheit or cleverness (Kant [1785] 2006: sec. II: 27). 
Today, the common and more general meaning of prudence is long-sightedness, 
that is, the consideration of the effects our actions may have in the future. Prudence 
has also acquired the narrower meaning of long-sighted or enlightened self-interest 
 2 
(Bykvist 2013: 4180). When prudence is understood in the latter meaning, it becomes 
very similar to the rational behaviour typical of a self-interested economic agent and 
ceases to be a virtue in any possible sense. 
The change in the meaning of prudence in the history of philosophy is also 
mirrored in the differing positions that appear in Adam Smith scholarship, where 
prudence has often been either misunderstood as tantamount to self-interest and self-
love, or simply overlooked. On the one hand, several scholars of Smith’s ethics 
consider prudence a minor topic, as Smith allegedly defines it as an inferior virtue, 
and they focus more on the virtues of justice, self-command, and beneficence. For 
example, Vivienne Brown states that, although Smith considers prudence a virtue, it is 
not a truly moral virtue because it is not subject to the dialogic relation between the 
moral agent and the impartial spectator, which means that prudent actions do not 
require the agent to change place with the impartial spectator (Brown 1994: 25, 33-34, 
46). Other scholars of Smith’s ethics give more importance to prudence within his 
system of ideas. However, their views of Smith’s prudence are not consistent with 
several crucial features of his treatment of it. I go on to show this when discussing 
Ryan Hanley’s identification of Smith’s prudence with a low form of self-love and 
Douglas Den Uyl’s thesis that prudence is incompatible with the care for others and 
impartiality. On the other hand, several scholars of Smith’s economic thought equate 
prudence with a clever self-interested motive for action. For instance, George Stigler 
assumes that prudence is self-interest without demonstrating this identification 
(Stigler 1971: 265); Samuel Hollander contends that prudence is a synonym of self-
love, which is, itself, a synonym of self-interest (Hollander 1977: 138-139). 
Unlike these approaches, in this paper I argue that prudence is a crucial topic for 
anybody who wants to make sense of Smith’s system of ideas and I correctly position 
prudence within Smith’s system of ideas. Prudence is fundamental to understanding 
Smith’s thought for two reasons: First, prudence is the factor that overcomes two 
types of opposition that every moral theory has to face, namely the opposition 
between the self and the other, and that between partiality and impartiality. Second, 
prudence is an overarching norm of conduct for the agent’s moral and economic 
decision-making. This means that prudence avoids the division of the agent into a 
moral agent and an economic actor who have little in common.  
Smith’s view of prudence not only has to be taken into account in order to clarify 
several crucial questions emerging from his system; it is also interesting in itself for 
 3 
its impact on ethical theory for two motives. The first is that Smith’s view of 
prudence contributes to the discussion about what a moral theory can require from the 
moral agent – that is, what the individual owes to herself and to other people − and to 
the discussion about what type of impartiality a moral theory can demand. The second 
motive is that Smith’s prudence contributes to the debate on the relation between the 
moral and the economic sides of the agent.  
 
 
1. Smith’s view of prudence 
1.1 The definition of prudence in Part VI of The Theory of Moral Sentiments  
Smith deals extensively with the virtue of prudence in the first section of Part VI, 
which he added to the sixth edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), 
published in May, 1790. A shorter description of prudence features in the first edition 
of 1759 (TMS IV.2.6: 189)2 and in the draft of the TMS that was written in the 1750s 
(Vivenza 2001: 54). 
Smith starts Part VI by focusing on what he calls inferior prudence and defines it 
as ‘The care of the health, of the fortune, of the rank and reputation of the individual, 
the objects upon which his comfort and happiness in this life are supposed principally 
to depend’ (TMS VI.i.5: 213).3 Prudence is a self-regarding or self-centred virtue 
because its objects are one’s own personal interests and well-being, which are part of 
happiness. According to Smith, material goods − named the ‘advantages of our 
external fortune’ − are pursued because they constitute means for self-preservation 
(TMS VI.i.2-3: 212). In addition, since one of the strongest human desires is to be 
praised, and reputation and rank in society partly depend on the possession of material 
goods, humans also pursue material goods in order to be regarded by others (TMS 
VI.i.3: 212-213).4 Credit among peers also depends on the individual’s character and 
conduct (TMS VI.i.4: 212-213), thus a virtuous behaviour represents another source 
of good reputation.  
 
1.2 Prudence and its relation to Smith’s moral psychology, justice, and self-
command 
In order to understand Smith’s prudence, this virtue needs to be viewed against the 
background of his moral psychology and compared with two other items in his 
catalogue of virtues, namely justice and self-command. 
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According to Smith, the individual is fitter and abler to take care of herself, and of 
the objects of prudence, than of other people (TMS VI.ii.1.1: 219) because she feels 
her emotions directly, whereas she can only imagine the sensations of others. 
However, there is a psychological mechanism that enables human beings to overcome 
the separation of their bodies: sympathy (TMS I.i.1.2: 9). Sympathy is defined by 
Smith as the fellow-feeling with an agent’s passions, and it is experienced by the 
individual who is observing the agent (TMS I.i.1.5: 10) – called observer or spectator 
– through an imaginary change of place between the spectator and the agent (TMS 
I.i.1.2: 9; VII.iii.1.4: 317). When the spectator changes places with the agent, two 
reactions can occur: She feels either a similar or a different emotion to that of the 
agent. In the first case, the spectator necessarily considers the agent’s emotion as just, 
proper, and she approves of it.5 If the spectator does not find a similarity between her 
emotion and the agent’s, she considers the agent’s emotion unjust, improper, and she 
disapproves of it (TMS I.i.3.1: 16). Even the agent is involved in the change of 
perspectives, because if she wants to be approved of by the other, she needs to make 
her feelings similar to those of the spectator, and in order to do this she needs to adopt 
the spectator’s perspective (TMS I.i.4.8: 22). 
When the agent evaluates her own conduct, the process is similar to that applied in 
assessing others’ conduct, because she imagines dividing herself into two persons: the 
agent whose conduct is judged and a fair and impartial judge informed of the relevant 
facts, labelled by Smith as ‘impartial spectator’ (TMS III.1.6: 113). The impartial 
spectator is partly the introjection of real viewers that the individual has met in her 
life and partly the result of her reflection on that of which an impartial spectator 
should approve, namely that which is praiseworthy (TMS III.2.32: 131). The agent 
imagines being the spectator who is observing her at a distance and having the 
feelings that such a spectator would have when observing her conduct. The agent’s 
conduct is justified only if, once she has exchanged places with the impartial 
spectator, she discovers that her feelings as an impartial spectator are similar to her 
feelings as an agent (TMS III.1.2: 109). In other words, the impartial spectator 
approves of the individual’s conduct when the impartial spectator sympathises with 
the agent’s emotions and motives for action. Hence, the impartial spectator is an 
imaginary device that enables the agent to consider her case, feelings, and motives 
more objectively, by distancing herself from them.  
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Since prudence is fundamentally the care of our own interests and given that the 
impartial spectator is the psychological device that makes us see everything that 
concerns us more objectively, Smithian prudence is limited by the impartial 
spectator’s consideration that the agent is ‘but one of the multitude, in no respect 
better than any other in it […]. It is from him [the impartial spectator] only that we 
learn the real littleness of ourselves’ (TMS III.3.4: 137). Thus, through the 
acknowledgment of having no special status compared to others, the agent becomes 
able to lend her interests, needs, and passions a proportionate weight.  
The sense of justice is the sense of impartiality based on the impartial spectator’s 
judgments about that which concerns and interests us. In Smith’s system, justice is the 
abstention from harming others and their happiness (TMS VI.ii.intro.2: 218). The 
sense of justice is a restraint of prudence, for prudence is the care of one’s own 
interests, which, if pursued at the expense of others, may harm others by using them 
or disturbing their happiness (TMS II.iii.1.5: 95-96). The sense of justice requires of 
the prudent agent the consideration of others in the negative sense of not hurting 
them. This means that when the agent wants to pursue an object of prudence, this 
object and the way to reach it have to be assessed and approved by the impartial 
spectator. Thus, the sense of justice limits the individual’s self-love, which is her 
natural preference for her own happiness (TMS II.ii.2.1: 82-83). 
One of the two motives behind the agent’s moderation of her passions when 
observed is the desire to be praised and esteemed, which is one of the main principles 
of human nature according to Smith (TMS VI.i.3: 212-213). Since spectators always 
feel weaker passions when exchanging places with the agent, they will sympathise 
with her – and thus praise and esteem her – only if she mitigates what she feels. The 
individual seeks the approbation of others because it is very pleasurable for her. 
Besides the desire to be praised, the second principle of human nature that motivates 
the agent to mitigate her passions is the desire to be praiseworthy, namely to be the 
natural and proper object of praise, even when nobody is observing her conduct (TMS 
III.2.1: 113-114). The individual is driven by this desire when she seeks the 
approbation of the impartial spectator (TMS III.3.4: 137), who is a more reliable 
mirror for the scrutiny of her conduct than real spectators. One of the objects of 
Smithian prudence is the credit among peers, and, since this credit depends on others’ 
esteem, prudence is stimulated by the desire to be praised. In addition, since Smith’s 
‘prudent man’ aims to establish a good reputation through the real possession of 
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knowledge and abilities, as I will show in the next section, even the desire to be 
praiseworthy encourages prudence. 
If we consider the objects of prudence and the natural tendency to seek them, 
prudence would seem a self-interested attitude, which reflects how humans generally 
behave. The normative element that elevates prudence to the status of a virtue is self-
command. Self-command is the ability to be the master of oneself, that is, the ability 
to exercise discipline over one’s own feelings (TMS III.3.23: 145).6 Self-command is 
what makes it possible to implement moral actions. In fact, Smith states,  
The man who acts according to the rules of perfect prudence, of strict justice, and 
of proper benevolence may be said to be perfectly virtuous. But the most perfect 
knowledge of those rules will not alone enable him to act in this manner: his own 
passions are very apt to mislead him [...]. The most perfect knowledge, if it is not 
supported by the most perfect self-command, will not always enable him to do his 
duty. (TMS VI.iii.1: 237) 
In Smith’s system, self-command is a sort of architectural virtue, serving as the 
basis of all virtues, and all virtues seem to derive their principal lustre from self-
command (TMS VI.iii.11: 241). This is especially true for the virtue of prudence, 
since, while justice and beneficence are noble and splendid per se because of their 
objects (i.e., respectively, not hurting others and promoting their happiness), prudence 
is a virtue because it is supported by self-command. This is the first way in which 
self-command sustains prudence. The latter cannot be noble and splendid because of 
its object, which is one’s own happiness, since this object is naturally pursued by 
individuals and thus does not require effort. The individual respects the restraint of 
prudence deriving from the sense of justice thanks to self-command, because it is 
through self-command that she refrains from harming others when satisfying her own 
needs (TMS VI.iii.1: 237).  
The bond between prudence and self-command becomes more apparent when both 
virtues are viewed in light of Smith’s moral psychology. Since the individual by 
nature needs other people’s esteem and self-approbation (respectively, the objects of 
the desire to be praised and the desire to be praiseworthy), she is engaged in changing 
places with real spectators and with an ideal observer, in order to verify if she 
deserves esteem (sympathy). After the imaginary exchange of positions, the 
individual considers her conduct more objectively (sense of justice); however, when 
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she assesses a conduct of hers in which her personal interests are involved, her selfish 
passions set themselves against the sense of justice. Self-command intervenes at this 
point by limiting selfish passions and consequently making the individual pursue her 
interests more objectively, in accordance with the sense of justice. Thanks to self-
command and the sense of justice, prudence is an appropriate care of oneself. 
Certainly, it descends from selfish passions (TMS I.ii.5.1: 40-41) and is originally 
self-centred, but regard for the sentiments of others enforces and directs the practice 
of prudence (TMS VI.concl.1: 262). 
Once prudence is viewed against the background of Smith’s moral psychology, 
Brown’s thesis that prudence is not subject to the impartial spectator cannot be 
upheld. In fact, since prudence is restrained by the sense of justice – which is based 
on the impartial spectator’s perspective – and since rank and reputation can be 
obtained through praiseworthy actions – which are those approved of by the impartial 
spectator – prudence requires the agent’s shift of perspective with the impartial 
spectator and the dialogic interplay between the agent and the impartial spectator. 
 
1.3 The portrait of the prudent man 
In Part VI of the TMS, Smith also provides a detailed description of the prudent 
man, which is essential to better understand prudence. The prudent man pursues 
esteem and respect in two ways, as previously mentioned: by practising virtues and by 
acquiring material goods. In order to build a good reputation and to improve his 
material condition, the prudent man relies on his knowledge and abilities. So as to 
obtain other people’s praise, he does not parade his abilities and does not simulate 
those that he lacks (TMS VI.i.7: 213). He is earnest and genuine in social 
relationships as well as in his profession (TMS VI.i.7-8: 213-214). Thus, he is moved, 
but not overcome, by the desire to be praised, neither is he ambitious (TMS VI.i.13: 
215-216). The consequence of the latter trait is that the prudent man is not much 
interested in public life; however, he is not a misanthrope because he is very capable 
of real friendship. What he dislikes of public life is that it could interfere with the 
regularity of his temperance, the steadiness of his industry, and the strictness of his 
frugality (TMS VI.i.9: 214). 
As the first and principal object of prudence is security (TMS VI.i.6: 213), the 
prudent man prefers to preserve the advantages that he already has rather than 
undertake new enterprises and adventures that can lead to greater advantages at some 
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degree of risk. The aversion to hazard makes the individual pursue the aim of 
bettering his condition in risk-free ways: improving knowledge and skill in his 
profession, being assiduous and industrious in his occupation, and frugal and 
parsimonious in all his expenses (TMS VI.i.6: 213). This slow but gradual betterment 
produces tranquillity in the prudent man’s life (TMS VI.i.12: 215), which is a 
fundamental constituent of happiness that completely satisfies him. 
Self-command sustains prudence in a second way: The prudent man’s frugality, 
parsimony, and industry derive from sacrificing the enjoyment of a present pleasure 
for a probable greater pleasure in the future. In humans the desire for present 
enjoyment is more vivid and intense than the desire for future pleasure, but, in the 
prudent character, self-command curbs the desire for present enjoyment (TMS 
VI.i.11: 215). In this way, the agent sees the two pleasures from the same distance. 
Self-command renders the agent patient. Patience is the noblest component of 
prudence, according to Smith, because it is the part of prudence that requires most 
effort, and, therefore, it is not approved of but also applauded by the impartial 
spectator (ibidem).  
Since prudence is the care of one’s own business and well-being, the prudent man 
needs long-sightedness to foresee the effects of his actions and thus to undertake risk-
free activities (TMS IV.2.6: 189; VI.i.12: 215). In the first edition of the TMS, long-
sightedness and patience are indicated as the components of prudence. In fact, 
prudence is illustrated as the sum of self-command − in the sense of patience − and 
superior reasoning and understanding − characterised as the ability to discern the 
consequences of our actions and the advantage or detriment which is likely to result 
from them (TMS IV.2.6: 189).  
Smith’s portrait of the prudent man shows that this individual is completely unlike 
the self-interested and calculating agent who was attributed to Smith’s model of 
agent7 and has been considered responsible for the excesses of capitalism. Certainly, 
the prudent man is not Smith’s heroic moral character, a role rather reserved to the 
man cultivating nobler virtues, such as beneficence. Yet the prudent man is an 
achievable type of moral character characterised by industriousness, steadiness, 
patience, and moderation.  
 
1.4 Superior prudence 
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At the end of the first section of Part VI, Smith introduces a second type of 
prudence, called superior prudence. He moves on from inferior prudence to superior 
prudence while dealing with the sentiments that the first type of prudence excites in 
the spectators. This passage is fundamental, since in the Smithian system, virtues are 
defined on the basis of the reaction they cause in spectators. According to Smith, 
virtue is an excellence that is amiable and meritorious, namely it deserves, 
respectively, love and reward because it excites feelings of love and gratitude in the 
spectator (TMS III.1.7: 113). According to Smith, inferior prudence is regarded as 
respectable and, to some degree, amiable and agreeable, but ‘it never is considered as 
one, either of the most endearing, or of the most ennobling of the virtues. It 
commands a certain cold esteem, but seems not entitled to any very ardent love or 
admiration’ (TMS VI.i.14: 216). 
On the contrary, superior prudence excites admiration from observers. Superior 
prudence maintains the same components of inferior prudence: patience, long-
sightedness, aversion to hazards, and the adoption of the other’s perspective. 
However, the objects of superior prudence are nobler and greater than the care of 
health, fortune, rank, and reputation of the individual (TMS VI.i.15: 216). Smith, 
though, does not specify what the objects of superior prudence are.  
Moreover, superior prudence is constituted of virtues that are greater and more 
splendid than inferior prudence. Superior prudence is combined ‘with valour, with 
extensive and strong benevolence, with a sacred regard to the rules of justice, and all 
these supported by a proper degree of self-command’ (ibidem). When it approximates 
perfection, superior prudence supposes the most perfect propriety and the possession 
of all the intellectual and moral virtues. Smith does not provide a portrait of the man 
possessing superior prudence, but he states that this virtue characterises the great 
general, the great statesman, and the great legislator (ibidem). Superior prudence is an 
ideal goal for the average agent, and, in fact, it is typical of extraordinary people, as 
indicated by Smith’s examples of individuals who, he argues, possess it. Smith 
describes superior prudence as the best head joined with the best heart, and as the 
most perfect wisdom combined with the most perfect virtue (TMS VI.i.15: 216). In 
this description, stress is placed on the composite nature of superior prudence. On the 
one hand, the head is its calculative side, which is shared with inferior prudence and 
consists of long-sightedness, patience and a basic consideration of others; on the 
other, the heart is its noble side, constituted of the virtues that are greater and more 
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splendid than inferior prudence and directed to a more active consideration of others. 
The head is committed only to not hurting others; the heart is committed also to 
promoting their happiness, thanks to benevolence and a reinforced sense of justice. 
Finally, in Smith’s system of ideas, superior prudence is desirable per se and does 
not need an economic justification, whereas inferior prudence is the only virtue with 
an economic justification, as I will show in the following section.  
 
2. The hybrid nature of prudence and its worth for a moral and economic agent 
Smith asserts that, although virtues are pursued for their own sake, they also bring 
about positive effects such as success and well-being. As success and well-being add 
additional beauty and propriety to virtues that are already naturally beautiful and 
appropriate (TMS VII.ii.2.13: 298-299),8 Smith does not dwell on the usefulness of 
virtues, yet he makes an exception for inferior prudence. Inferior prudence is 
explicitly defined as the most useful virtue (TMS IV.2.1.6: 189). The reason for this 
has been mentioned in the portrait of the prudent man: long-sightedness, aversion to 
any hazard, and self-command in the form of patience allow the prudent man to 
slowly but constantly better his economic condition. The utility of prudence is 
illustrated partly in the TMS and partly in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations (WN). In the TMS, aversion to hazard prevents the individual 
from undertaking risky activities, and patience and long-sightedness – which prompt 
the individual to refrain from a present pleasure for a greater one in the future – 
provide the basis for parsimony and frugality (TMS VI.i.12: 215; VI.i.6: 213; 
IV.2.1.8: 189). Smith further stresses the economic value of prudence when he says 
that while the proper reward of virtues such as justice and humanity is being 
praiseworthy, the proper rewards of prudence are wealth and external honours, which 
prudence seldom fails to acquire (TMS III.5.8: 166-167). 
In the WN, Smith explains that parsimony accumulates capital, whereas 
prodigality and bad management diminish it (WN II.iii.13-14: 337).9 Industriousness 
‘provides the subject [that] which parsimony accumulates. But whatever industry 
might acquire, if parsimony did not save and store up, the capital would never be the 
greater’ (WN II.iii.16: 337). Parsimony is thus fundamental for the progress of 
opulence, or, in today’s terms, economic growth, because it generates savings. These 
savings are the accumulated capital that then enters the economic cycle not as 
consumption – since the prudent man is modest and frugal – but as investment to 
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obtain profit, which in turn increases savings (WN II.iii.17-18: 337-338).10 Parsimony 
is prompted by a fundamental principle of human nature: the desire to better one’s 
own condition. Smith states that the easiest way to better one’s own condition is to 
augment one’s own fortune through savings (WN II.3.28: 341-342).11 Wealth in itself 
has no moral worth, as it can be acquired rightly or wrongly (Calkins and Werhane 
1998: 46), but if it is acquired rightly, it is the tangible evidence of prudence.  
At the same time, prudence is useful for the practice of other-regarding virtues, 
such as beneficence and justice. In a condition of misery and adversity we are unable 
to take care of others, nor sympathise with them: ‘Before we can feel much for others, 
we must in some measure be at ease ourselves’ (TMS V.2.9: 205). In fact, in such a 
condition, our basic needs are not satisfied, they thus completely draw our attention 
and we need to control our own intense feelings coming from these basic needs (TMS 
III.3.37: 153).  
Prudence, therefore, is in Smith’s system a hybrid virtue because it is both a moral 
and an economic excellence. In economics prudence represents the starting point of 
economic growth and of the betterment of one’s own condition (Campbell 1967: 573). 
In ethics, prudence is the condition of possibility to exercise the other virtues; thus, it 
is the irreplaceable starting point of moral development. Prudence is a norm of 
conduct that guides the individual’s actions both in the moral and the economic 
spheres. Connecting these spheres of the agent’s life, prudence represents one of the 
strongest common and cohesive points between the TMS and the WN. As Alec 
Macfie assesses, prudence is one of the soundest pieces of evidence against the so-
called Das Adam Smith Problem (Macfie 1967: 73-75), namely the belief that the 
TMS is inconsistent with the WN because they describe two different agents: an 
altruist agent in the TMS and a selfish agent in the WN. As a consequence, prudence 
is also one of the strongest elements that demonstrate that Smith’s prudent man is not 
the homo oeconomicus of mainstream economics.  
 
3. Prudence and the tension between the self and the other and between 
partiality and impartiality 
In order to understand the role carried out by prudence in solving the oppositions 
between the self and the other and between partiality and impartiality, a preliminary 
distinction between three concepts connected with the care of oneself is required. Self-
preservation, self-interest, and self-love have often been misunderstood in Smith 
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scholarship. Stigler’s and Hollander’s identification of prudence with self-interest is a 
clear example of this misinterpretation. Smith does not provide a clear definition of 
these concepts, but a careful examination of the contexts of their appearance helps us 
to understand the differences between them.  
 
3.1 Self-preservation 
Self-preservation is an instinct that drives the individual to choose the factors that 
safeguard her preservation and that are chosen because they cause pleasurable 
sensations in her. Self-preservation also makes the individual withdraw from the 
things that are detrimental to her life and that excite painful sensations in her (TMS 
VI.i.1: 212; II.i.5.10: 77). In other words, self-preservation is the individual’s natural 
tendency to take care of herself. Self-preservation shares with prudence the care of the 
individual’s health. 
 
3.2 Self-interest 
In the TMS, self-interest is the pursuit of objects of private interest: social 
positions, important offices, and advantageous deals (TMS III.6.6-7: 172-173).12 Such 
objects constitute the purposes of prudence (health, fortune, rank, and reputation); 
hence, prudence is provided with its objects by self-interest. This interpretation of 
mine is supported by two passages. The first passage is in Smith’s discussion of the 
word ‘justice’, where he affirms that when it is said that we do not do justice to 
ourselves because we do not manifest enough attention to the objects of self-interest, 
the word ‘justice’ denotes a propriety of conduct towards ourselves that requires the 
virtue of prudence (TMS VII.ii.1.10: 270). The second passage is Smith’s affirmation 
that ‘The habits of oeconomy, industry, discretion, attention, and application of 
thought, are generally supposed to be cultivated from self-interested motives’ (TMS 
VII.ii.3.16: 304), and these qualities are previously connected with patience, and thus 
prudence, by Smith (TMS IV.2.8: 189-190).  
In sixteenth-century Western Europe, the word ‘interest’ meant concerns, 
advantages, and the totality of an individual’s aspirations; it also contained an element 
of rationality or calculating efficiency that is needed to pursue aspirations (Hirschman 
1977: 32). In England, towards the end of the seventeenth century, this term began to 
indicate economic advantage, acquiring the economic meaning that is present in the 
WN. This was a period of political stability and religious tolerance in which ‘interest’ 
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began to be discussed in terms of the economic aspirations of groups or individuals  
(Heath 2013: 244; Hirschman 1977: 36-37; Raab 1964, n. 6: 237). While the word 
‘interest’ appears many times in the WN, ‘self-interest’ occurs only once (Force 2003: 
1) – in the passage in which Smith writes that the inferior clergy of the Church of 
Rome is frugal and industrious for self-interested motives. This is because, since the 
oblations from people support the subsistence of the parochial clergy and the 
mendicant orders, this part of the clergy animates the devotion of people in order to 
obtain the means of subsistence (WN V.i.g.2: 789-790). 
 
3.3 Self-love 
Unlike self-preservation and self-interest, self-love is a concept that introduces a 
relation between the self and the other because Smith defines it as the natural 
preference that every one has for her own happiness over the happiness of others 
(TMS II.ii.2.1: 82-83). One’s own happiness is not necessarily sought at the expense 
of others, but this can occur. Self-love is a preference that the individual has for 
herself from her own point of view, especially when she is struck by intense passions 
(TMS III.4.3: 157). Yet she does not adopt self-love as a justified principle for action, 
because the impartial and the real spectators do not approve of this motive, and 
without this approbation the action is not justified (TMS II.ii.2.1: 82-83). Since self-
love is partial, it has to be curbed to a degree that can be shared − and thus approved 
of − by other people. More precisely, self-love is tolerated if others are not exploited 
or sacrificed to the individual’s happiness, convenience or mood (TMS II.iii.1.5: 95-
96). The spectators do not approve of excesses of self-love because the individual 
does not have a special status compared to that of others.  
Smith does not explicitly distinguish self-love and self-interest, and in some places 
he seems to use them interchangeably. He uses them as synonyms when he speaks of 
the moral systems that deduce all the sentiments of humans from refinements of self-
love or, a little further on, from ‘self-interested considerations’ (TMS I.i.2.1: 14),13 
and when he discusses Zeno’s (TMS VII.ii.1.15-16: 272-273) and Francis 
Hutcheson’s philosophy (TMS VII.ii.3.12-14, 16: 303-304).  Some scholars assert that 
Smith uses ‘self-love’ and ‘self-interest’ interchangeably.14 David Raphael and 
Macfie assume that ‘self-love’ and ‘self-interest’ were generally considered synonyms 
in the eighteenth century (Raphael and Macfie 1976: 22). However, in both the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these terms were not univocal (Heath 2013: 
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247). Smith mentions the entry on amour-propre appeared in the edition of 
Encyclopédie of 1755 and defined as a preferment for oneself, in a letter to the journal 
Edinburgh Review, thus indicating that he knew the meaning attributed to self-love by 
encyclopaedists (Smith 1980: 245).15  
If every occurrence of ‘self-love’ and ‘self-interest’ is analysed, Smith seems to 
use them as synonyms when he describes the moral systems of other philosophers. 
Yet when he illustrates his own system, ‘self-love’ has a different nuance: There is 
always an explicit or implicit comparison between the self and the other (TMS 
II.ii.2.1: 82-83; II.iii.1.5: 96; III.3.4-6: 136-139). On the other hand, when Smith uses 
the term ‘self-interest’ there is no reference to the other. As Eugene Heath highlights, 
self-love is defined as a preference for the self because self-love supposes an ordering 
of values in which the self has priority (Heath 2013: 250), whereas self-interest does 
not assume this ordering. Since it is neither correct nor appropriate to always put the 
self at the top of the hierarchy of values – because it is a form of partiality – Smith 
characterises self-love as a delusion that prevents us from seeing the deformity of our 
conduct (TMS III.4.4, 6-7, 12: 157-159); thus, self-love is immoral. But since in self-
interest there is no reference to other people, self-interest can be interpreted as amoral.  
Certainly, Smith does not use ‘self-interest’ and ‘self-love’ interchangeably 
because of variety of expressions, as Robert Black contends (2006: 8), because when 
Smith dwells on self-love as a preference for oneself, he repeats this term many times 
in the same paragraph and in consecutive paragraphs without alternating it with ‘self-
interest’ (TMS III.3.4-6: 136-139; III.4.12: 160-161). 
In the WN, the term ‘self-love’ occurs twice in a context of individual commercial 
exchange that affects the well-being of individuals. Self-love is the individual’s 
personal interest. In an exchange, an agent has to address herself to the other party’s 
self-love, if she wants to obtain something from the other party: ‘Whoever offers to 
another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and 
you shall have this which you want’ (WN I.ii.2: 26). Smith uses the expression 
‘private interests’ in the WN to indicate the advantages of individuals or groups of 
individuals that do not concern themselves with society as a whole, but that 
nonetheless benefit the society by following their own interests and passions (WN 
IV.vii.88: 630; IV.ii.9: 456). These private interests can be pursued against the public, 
just as in the TMS self-love is pursued at the expense of others. In particular, 
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merchants and manufacturers are the usual figures that tend to deceive and oppress 
the public for their own interest.16 
Hanley supports the distinction between self-love and self-interest in Smith’s 
system of ideas, but he reads prudence, magnanimity, and beneficence as different 
forms of self-love, understood as the love of oneself that evolves from the most basic 
form (prudence defined as self-worth via recognition) (Hanley 2009: 104) to the most 
elevated form (beneficence defined as cultivation of the noblest part of the self) (ibi: 
94).17 However, there is no textual evidence in Smith’s works that prudence, 
magnanimity, and beneficence are modifications of self-love, or that they build on 
one another.  There is also no textual basis for the equation of prudence with a low 
form of self-love. Moreover, this reading overlooks the essential difference between 
prudence and beneficence: While the former promotes one’s own happiness, the latter 
promotes the happiness of others (TMS VI.intro.1: 212; VI.concl.1: 262).18 And 
although prudence shares the same purpose as self-love − along with self-interest and 
self-preservation − namely the care of oneself, prudence belongs to a different level of 
reality. In fact, self-preservation, self-interest, and self-love belong to the descriptive 
level of reality, since they describe how humans normally behave. On the contrary, 
even though prudence is based on self-preservation, self-interest, and self-love, it has 
a normative side because it represents a regulation of those natural tendencies, in the 
sense that the prudent agent takes care of herself under a constraint that she 
deliberately imposes on herself through self-command. Constrained by the sense of 
justice, in the TMS prudence modifies both self-interest and self-love, because it 
opens up self-interest to the comparison with the other and prevents self-love from 
always prioritising the self in the relation between the self and the other. In other 
words, compared to self-interest, prudence includes the consideration of others; 
compared to self-love, prudence is a type of consideration of others that aims to be 
impartial. 
 
3.4 Prudence as a response to the opposition between the self and the other and 
between partiality and impartiality 
According to several scholars of Smith, prudence as a virtue is problematic 
because of its irreducible self-centredness; being self-regarding is the essential trait of 
prudence, but it is precisely this trait that prevents prudence from opening up to the 
care of others (Lipka 2013: 9; Den Uyl 1991: 137). Thus, according to this 
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interpretation, prudence produces a tension between the care of oneself and the care 
of others. 
However, as illustrated above, prudence is not self-interested but self-centred. 
Prudence includes a two-fold consideration of others: On the one hand, the individual 
cares about her reputation and her fortune because she strongly desires to be regarded 
by others and to be worthy of this regard; on the other, in order to obtain this regard 
from (real or imagined) others, she has to consider the effects of her actions on others, 
both in the sense of other people’s reaction to her conduct and in the sense of the 
harm that she can cause others (Charlier 1996: 276-278). In fact, the prudent man 
accepts that he has duties towards others (C. Smith 2010: 141). Thus, prudence 
includes the consideration of others as subjective and objective genitive. The 
consideration of others as objective genitive is the basis of the care of others. If the 
inclusion of the other is not considered in the virtue of prudence, as Douglas Den Uyl 
sustains, then prudence is isolated from other-regarding virtues and in contrast with 
them. However, prudence is originally open to the other, on the basis of Smith’s 
moral psychology, which comprises of the desires to be praised and to be 
praiseworthy, and the consequent adoption of other (real or hypothetical) people’s 
perspective. It is the consideration of others in an originally self-centred virtue that 
makes the Smithian agent a consistent one, who does not give up her moral identity 
when taking economic decisions and vice versa. Prudence avoids the division of the 
individual into a moral agent and an economic agent that are independent of each 
other. 
While the opposition between the self and the other can be solved by prudence if 
prudence is correctly understood in Smith’s ethic and economic system, tension may 
arise at the level of the moral justification of actions. Den Uyl affirms that Smith has 
contributed to the decline of prudence by insisting that constraints of impartiality are 
necessary to justify a moral action (Den Uyl 1991: 124, 137-138). According to Den 
Uyl, the impartial spectator introduces an impersonal trait into Smith’s ethics that 
competes with a virtue – prudence – that is personal and particular.  
However, since Smith concedes that actions motivated by self-interest can be 
moral and includes them in the domain of praiseworthy actions, his system is not a 
form of impersonalism. In fact, in one passage Smith states that the human condition 
would be too harsh if the affections that influence our conduct were not defined as 
virtuous (TMS VII.ii.3.18: 305). Here he is most likely referring to self-interested 
 17 
affections, because this passage criticises the system of Hutcheson, who does not 
attribute moral status to self-interested actions (TMS VII.ii.3.15-16: 304). Thus, the 
tension between particular interests and an impartial justification is present only if 
impartiality is equated with impersonality, as Den Uyl sustains when he says that the 
impartial spectator is no particular person at all (Den Uyl 1991: 138). Yet in the 
adoption of the impartial spectator’s perspective, the self that distances itself from its 
own interests is the same self that has these interests, as Bernard Williams 
demonstrates (Williams 1985: 67). Therefore, even though the individual duplicates 
herself, she does not become an agent whose main interest is the harmony of all the 
interests of others; and if she forces herself to become a sort of impersonal spectator, 
she is alienated from herself, detaching herself from what constitutes her identity. 
Smith’s impartiality is harmonised with some degree of partiality since the spectators 
concede that the agent pursues her happiness with more assiduity than that of others 
(TMS II.ii.2.1: 82-83). This assiduity, though, is always subject to the prohibition of 
using others for one’s own purposes:  
In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, [the individual] may run as 
hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his 
competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of 
the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play. (TMS II.ii.2.1: 83) 
Smith’s impartial spectator concedes what in contemporary debate is first-order 
partiality,19 namely, the impartial spectator approves of the individual’s special 
attention for her own interests. Smith’s impartiality progressively expands to more 
people (from socially close to socially distant people) and requires contact with many 
spectators.20 This circle expands towards an ideal that is out of reach − because we are 
limited creatures − but that can be progressively approximated. Since prudence is 
nothing but the care of one’s own happiness under the constraint of not using others, 
it is this virtue that harmonises first-order partiality with impartiality and prevents the 
individual from being divided into a self that cares only for itself and a self that cares 
only for others.  
 
Conclusion  
 18 
In this paper I have discussed Smith’s concept of prudence. My aim was to 
position and attribute the correct degree of importance to a virtue, prudence, that 
underpins Smith’s system of ideas but that has been inaccurately characterised. 
Firstly, I have cleaned up misinterpretations of this concept in Smith scholarship. I 
have analysed the concepts with which Smith’s prudence is usually confused, namely 
self-preservation, self-interest, and self-love. I have compared them with prudence, 
and demonstrated that prudence, even though shares its objects with those concepts, 
unlike them, is normative and includes a consideration of others that aims to be 
impartial.  
Secondly, I have explained why Smith’s prudence is a crucial topic in his system 
of ideas. The reason is that prudence clarifies three central questions concerning the 
structure of Smith’s system: the interaction existing between the moral and the 
economic agent; the relationship between the self and the other; and the dialectical 
tension between partiality and impartiality.  
Thirdly, I have shown that Smith’s prudence yields a fruitful contribution to 
present-day ethical theory, insofar as it suggests a route out of tensions arising from 
the three above-mentioned oppositions.  
With regards to the opposition between the agent’s economic and moral sides, this 
opposition is usually treated in economists’ critical literature on Smith by conflating 
the prudent man with homo oeconomicus. In this paper, I have demonstrated that the 
two characters do coincide but in a different sense. This is because, in making any 
economic decision, Smith’s prudent man takes his moral side into account, and is thus 
an economic agent and a moral agent simultaneously. In fact, in disagreement with 
both Bernard Mandeville and Hutcheson, Smith argues that a virtue can be self-
regarding and produce economic advantages without ceasing to be a moral virtue.  
Concerning the opposition between the self and the other, I have argued that 
Smithian prudence is a care for oneself that is limited from the outset by the 
consideration of others in the form of not using them. In fact, this form of 
consideration of others is the basis of the care for others and the bridge between 
prudence and other-regarding virtues. Hence, prudence is not opposed to the care of 
others. 
Regarding the opposition between partiality and impartiality, I have shown that 
Smithian prudence is a norm of conduct harmonising first-order partiality connected 
with the agent’s own interests with impartiality owed to other individuals. Thus, 
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within such a moral system, the agent never risks alienating herself from her identity 
when practising prudence.  
 
 
Notes 
1. Hobbes and Hume consider prudence as a virtue. However, Hobbes treats 
prudence as a personal − not moral − virtue that does not deserve praise, since it 
benefits only the person who possesses it (Gert 2010: 90); Hume defines 
prudence as a natural ability that can be considered a moral virtue, but he only 
briefly mentions it (Hume [1738-1740] 1928, book III, part iii, sec. 3: 606-611). 
2. All passages of the TMS are from The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D. 
Raphael and A. L. Macfie, in Adam Smith, The Glasgow Edition of the Works 
and Correspondence of Adam Smith, vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
3. For simplicity, I will call inferior prudence ‘prudence’, and use the expression 
‘inferior prudence’ only to distinguish it from ‘superior prudence’. 
4. See also Skinner (1992: 153-154). 
5. The sympathetic feeling is not the same feeling as the agent’s, because the former 
is only imagined, thus it has a lower degree and it varies in kind (TMS I.i.4.8: 22). 
As Broadie clarifies, when sympathy occurs, the spectator that is observing an 
agent feeling anger or joy feels anger or joy sympathetically, that is she imagines 
being the agent and experiencing those feelings (Broadie 2006: 164).   
6. See also TMS III.3.22-28: 145-148; VI.iii.1-22: 237-247. 
7. See for example Stigler 1971. 
8. See also TMS IV.2.1-4: 179-180. 
9. All passages of the WN are from An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, in Adam Smith, The 
Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, vol. II, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
10. See Taylor (1965: 114-117). 
11. See also Raphael and Macfie (1976: 8-10). 
12. With regards to this passage, Smith writes in paragraph 6 ‘objects of private 
interest’ and in paragraph 7 ‘objects of self-interest’, but these objects are the 
same, varying only in their importance: They can be ordinary, such as some 
shillings, or more extraordinary, such as a province, an estate or an extraordinary 
job. 
13. See also TMS VII.iii.1.1: 312. 
14. See for example Black (2006: 8); Coase (1976); Metha (2006); Muller (1993: 
53-54); and Paganelli (2008). 
15. This letter is contained in Smith’s Essays on Philosophical Subjects. We do 
not know if Smith had read the entry on intérêt published in the edition of 
Encyclopédie of 1758. In this entry, the author, Jean-François Marquis de Saint-
Lambert, describes the popularity of the doctrine of self-interest, mentioning its 
upholders, such as Nicole, Pascal and La Rochefoucauld, and says that only 
recently a small group of men, namely the encyclopaedists, had dissociated self-
interest from vice and other bad meanings (Force 2003: 88-89). 
16. See WN I.xi.p.10: 267; IV.iii.c.9-10: 493-494. 
17. Even Force distinguishes self-love from self-interest, by stating that the former 
is an instinct of self-preservation (Force 2003: 1-2, 42-43); however, this is 
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arguable, because self-love is not the instinct of self-preservation, as we have 
seen.  
18. Hanley admits that beneficence requires some degrees of other-regard, but he 
adds that beneficence is something more (ibi: 94). On the contrary, according to 
Smith, the very essence of beneficence is being other-regarding (VI.concl.1: 262). 
19. See Jollimore (2014).  
20. See Cremaschi (1984: 85); Forman-Barzilai (2010: 120-134) and Nieli (1986). 
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